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Cybercrime vs. Cyberwar: Paradigms for 
Addressing Malicious Cyber Activity 
Mieke Eoyang* & Chimène Keitner** 
As we move toward a world of fully connected devices that share data on an 
unprecedented scale (the “Internet of Things” or IoT), the cybercrime enforce-
ment gap will pose an ever-greater threat to personal and national security.1 A va-
riety of factors contribute to the relative vulnerability of the United States to 
harm from malicious cyber activity (MCA).2 
See Jack Goldsmith & Stuart Russell, Strengths Become Vulnerabilities: How a Digital World
Disadvantages the United States in Its International Relations, AEGIS SERIES PAPER NO. 1806 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/M8LJ-HQZM.
In 2018, then-DHS Secretary 
Kirstjen Nielsen warned that “our digital lives are in danger like never before.”3 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, SECRETARY KIRSTJEN M. NIELSEN REMARKS: RETHINKING 
HOMELAND SECURITY IN AN AGE OF DISRUPTION (Sept. 5, 2018), https://perma.cc/DU2F-KXML.
She identified the threat as coming from “hostile states, terrorists, and transna-
tional criminals”—and, one might add, domestic terrorists and criminals.4 
See also FBI Director Christopher Wray, Statement Before the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee (Oct. 10, 2018) (indicating that “[v]irtually every national  and 
criminal threat the FBI faces is cyber-based or technologically facilitated”), https://perma.cc/DNU6- 
SUC5.
In the 
face of these various threats, U.S. government responses to national security chal-
lenges in both the physical and virtual worlds have increasingly blurred the line 
between transnational crime and armed conflict. This shift in narrative comes at a 
cost. The displacement of law enforcement approaches by an armed conflict 
model carries implications for institutional design, legal authorities, and resource 
allocation. Notably, one result of a militarized approach to transnational cyber 
threats has been to leave domestic law enforcement officers inadequately trained, 
inadequately resourced, and inadequately supported to identify, deter, and punish 
offenders.5 
See, e.g., Nick Selby, Local Police Don’t Go After Most Cybercriminals. We Need Better
Training., WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/6P9G-4LL8; on the scale of the 
problem, see e.g., JONATHAN LUSTHAUS, INDUSTRY OF ANONYMITY: INSIDE THE BUSINESS OF 
CYBERCRIME (2018). 
The urgent need for better resourced and better coordinated law 
enforcement responses suggests a corresponding need to keep the essentially 
criminal nature of most malicious cyber activity in focus, even as we grapple 
with the implications of MCA that is conducted, sponsored, encouraged, or tacitly 
permitted by nation-states. 
This contribution aims to encourage greater self-awareness about the consequences 
of viewing MCA predominantly through the lens of armed conflict, rather than law 
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1. See, e.g., Allison Peters & Amy Jordan, Countering the Cyber Enforcement Gap: Strengthening









enforcement. The tension between competing paradigms for addressing criminal ac-
tivity that rises to the level of a national security threat is familiar from—and can 
trace its roots to—the U.S. response to the attacks of 9/11. Rather than deal with 
transnational terrorism primarily as a law enforcement matter, the United States opted 
for a military response, invading Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. In the wake 
of 9/11, the U.S. government adopted the term “Global War on Terror” or GWOT 
and began viewing measures taken against terrorist groups and nation-states that har-
bor or support them through an armed conflict, rather than a law enforcement, lens. 
Many policy decisions previously addressed through civilian authorities and proc-
esses were revisited under new national security authorizations as part of this global 
“war.” For example, the decision to prosecute “enemy combatants” using military 
commissions rather than Article III courts exemplifies the view that the United States 
was, and is, engaged in a “war” on terror. Early justifications for the Bush administra-
tion’s Terrorist Surveillance Program, later revealed as “Stellar Wind,” rested on the 
President’s national security powers, and ignored existing civil and law enforcement 
authorities under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA).6 
See U.S. DEP’T JUST., OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., OVERSIGHT & REV. DIV., REPORT NO. 2009-0013-
AS, REV. DEP’T JUST.’S INVOLVEMENT WITH PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM (U) (2009), https:// 
perma.cc/P7H9-384M.
This 
militarized paradigm has become embedded in our vocabulary, and it has informed 
the allocation of authority and resources in efforts to protect the United States from 
terrorist threats. 
This contribution seeks to identify and assess the frameworks used to describe 
and deter malicious cyber activity, and to highlight legal and operational chal-
lenges in tackling problems that arise where these frameworks overlap or intersect. 
To that end, we examine two different models, an “armed conflict model” and a 
“law enforcement model,” that have been used to address the threat posed by such 
activity. The terms cyberwar and cybercrime, respectively, encapsulate each of 
these models—yet the line separating these categories is not well defined, and 
both terms have been used by laypersons and experts alike to describe conduct 
ranging from network intrusions to data exfiltration to denials-of-service. Our 
analysis of these ambiguities and their implications proceeds in four parts. Part I 
canvasses recent U.S. government approaches to combating MCA. Part II explores 
the assumptions underlying the predominant armed conflict model. Part III dis-
cusses the implications of characterizing MCA as cyberwar as opposed to cyber-
crime. Part IV concludes by suggesting that these characterizations should be 
viewed along a continuum, and that the law enforcement model should not be 
given short shrift by policy makers or—perhaps most importantly—appropriators. 
I. U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO CYBER THREATS 
As the United States began grappling seriously with cybersecurity and mali-
cious cyber activity, it did so within a militarized lens. In 2009, the Secretary of 
Defense directed the establishment of Cyber Command within the Department of 
6.
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Defense.7 
SEC. OF DEF., ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUBORDINATE UNIFIED U.S. CYBER COMMAND UNDER U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND FOR MILITARY CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS (2009), https://perma.cc/G37D-YXVB.
That same year, an international group of experts began deliberations 
on what became known as the Tallinn Manual, an attempt to detail the applicabil-
ity of international law principles to cyber conflict.8 A second Tallinn Manual 2.0 
elucidated international legal principles applicable to peacetime cyber opera-
tions.9 Unfortunately, experts were unable to agree on how to define the dividing 
line between cyber operations that amount to armed attacks and those that fall 
short of this level, which might also help differentiate between situations that 
warrant an armed conflict approach and those that should be treated as law 
enforcement matters.10 
The lack of clarity about what amounts to an armed attack in cyberspace also 
makes it difficult to disentangle and de-conflict militarized and civilian 
approaches to malicious cyber activity. Within a cyberwar frame, the Department 
of Defense has inaugurated a policy of “defend[ing] forward” to “disrupt or halt 
malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level 
of armed conflict.”11 
U.S. DEP’T DEF., SUMMARY: DEP’T DEF. CYBER STRATEGY 1 (2018), https://perma.cc/JK94-SMT4.
On the law enforcement side, the Department of Justice has 
pursued a cybercrime strategy of “attribution by indictment” to identify, deter, 
and punish malicious cyber actors who target the private sector, even when they 
do so on behalf of nation-states.12 Although, as explored below, some nation- 
state-sponsored cyber activity challenges the idea that we can always draw a clear 
distinction between transnational cybercrime and malicious activity just below 
the armed attack threshold, privileging a war (or potential war) model over a 
crime model carries substantial implications for the domestic allocation of resour-
ces and authority, and for the prospects of international cooperation to deter 
would-be cyber criminals and enforce prohibitions on MCA.13 
These implications were highlighted by President Obama’s use of the term “cyber-vandalism” to
characterize North Korea’s hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment. For criticism of this approach, see, 
e.g., David Rothkopf, Obama Is Wrong: The Sony Hack Is Not “Cybervandalism”, FOREIGN POL’Y 
(Dec. 22, 2014), https://perma.cc/ZLF9-MU6M.
We readily acknowledge that placing greater emphasis on the law enforcement 
paradigm is not a panacea. Notably—perhaps more so than any other previous 
7.
 
8. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N.
Schmitt, ed. 2013). 
9. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS 
(Michael N. Schmitt, ed. 2017). 
10. See Michael N. Schmitt, Peacetime Cyber Responses and Wartime Cyber Operations Under
International Law: An Analytical Vade Mecum, 8 HARV. NAT. SEC. J. 239, 245 (2017) (indicating that 
“[a]lthough the International Group of Experts agreed that cyber operations resulting in physical damage 
or injury are unambiguously uses of force, no consensus could be reached as to when cyber operations 
not having those consequences qualify”). 
11.  
12. See Chimène I. Keitner, Attribution by Indictment, 113 AJIL UNBOUND 207 (2019) (identifying
and analyzing the novel practice of publicly linking MCA to foreign states by announcing and releasing 
detailed indictments against foreign actors for violating U.S. criminal law); see also Garrett Hinck & 
Tim Maurer, Persistent Enforcement: Criminal Charges as a Response to Nation-State Malicious Cyber 
Activity, 10 J. NAT. SECURITY L. & POL’Y 525 (2020) (further exploring this practice). 
13.
 
2021] CYBERCRIME VS. CYBERWAR 329 
form of criminality—cyber criminality almost invariably involves actions 
(whether human or machine) across multiple territorial jurisdictions, potentially 
implicating multiple different domestic legal systems, and even different defini-
tions of what constitutes criminal behavior. Even under a law enforcement model, 
the degree of international cooperation required to apprehend and punish cyber 
criminals has, to date, proved to be a major obstacle to creating effective deter-
rence, even when the authors of MCA can be identified and their involvement 
proven with a sufficient degree of certainty based on admissible evidence.14 
See, e.g., Mike Eckel, For Russia and U.S., Uneasy Cooperation on Cybercrime Is Now a Mess,
RADIO FREE EUR/RADIO LIBERTY (Apr. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/529D-C8XW; Ron Cheng, 
Prospects for U.S.-China Cybercrime Cooperation: The Road Thus Far, LAWFARE (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/9KZV-EPW6.
Moreover, the potential involvement of nation-state actors means that the foreign 
policy consequences of law enforcement decisions need to be assessed on a regu-
lar basis.15 
It is curious in this regard that there was no apparent State Department representation in the bi- 
partisan Cyberspace Solarium Commission formed to study these issues. See Sen. Angus King & Rep. 
Mike Gallagher, Announcing the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, LAWFARE (Aug. 19, 2019, 3:13 
PM), https://perma.cc/RGZ3-KS5G.
In addition, in certain circumstances and with respect to certain actors, 
an armed conflict model might be more appropriate.16 
There is also a connection between state-sponsored and state-executed cybercrime and a state’s
ability to conduct armed attacks. See, e.g., Sébastien Seibt, How Cybercrime Funds North Korea’s 
Nuclear Programme, FRANCE24 (Aug. 8, 2019, 15:14), https://perma.cc/7CQ7-TVE9.
The need for flexibility and 
coordination requires an institutional structure that can oversee, direct, and de- 
conflict enforcement initiatives.17 
Although this institutional framework could take various forms, it did not escape notice that the
White House eliminated the position of cybersecurity coordinator on the National Security Council in 
May 2018. See Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, White House Eliminates Cybersecurity Coordinator 
Role, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/4TBR-XGFR.
With this backdrop in mind, this contribution aims to provoke deeper thinking 
about the relationship between the armed conflict model and the law enforcement 
model in addressing pervasive, costly, and disruptive MCA engaged in by a range 
of actors.18 In particular, it seeks to focus attention on a neglected aspect of con-
temporary approaches to deterring and punishing MCA, as illustrated in the dia-
gram below. Just as there are both machine-based and human-based defensive 
responses to MCA, so too are there machine-based and human-based offensive 
responses. In our view, human-based offensive responses have been insufficiently 









18. We have, for the purposes of this paper omitted, analysis of cyber attacks under other legal
frameworks designed to regulate spaces outside of designated sovereignty of a particular nation-state 
such as treaties relating to outer space law, the moon, and Antarctica. Those domains, unlike cyber, are 
not easily accessed or regularly used by civilian actors. Further, we have not analyzed responses to 
MCA under two other legal frameworks designed to regulate international commons: those governing 
the use of international airspace and the law of the sea. Analyses that draw on these paradigms generally 
focus on how to prescribe rules for cyberspace, whereas we are concerned primarily with how to enforce 
prohibitions on criminal activity that already exist under various countries’ domestic laws. 
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Fig. 1 
Typology of Responses to MCA 
Defensive Offensive 
Machine Network security (technical) “Defending forward”; network-to-
network; persistent engagement
Human Cybersecurity (behavioral) Criminal law responses; 
government-to-individual
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Defensive capabilities at the “machine” level must continue to be developed 
and implemented, just as offensive machine capabilities—used appropriately— 
can play an important role in U.S. cyber strategy. Likewise, it is essential to culti-
vate defensive human capabilities through education and outreach (and, if neces-
sary, incentives such as liability schemes). At the present time, however, our 
human offensive capabilities in the form of local, state, and federal law enforce-
ment responses remain severely neglected. There are good reasons to make the 
development of such capabilities a priority. 
We recognize that some of the above categories can more accurately be placed 
along a continuum, rather than in discrete boxes. Similarly, intelligence and counter- 
intelligence activities occupy an amorphous space between the traditional categories 
of war and crime. Appropriate responses to MCA cannot be identified solely on the 
identity of the perpetrator (e.g., nation-state vs. private actor) or the aim of the con-
duct (e.g., geopolitical vs. financial gain). Nation-state-sponsored activity can be 
directed towards both public and private sector activities (which can themselves be 
difficult to disentangle), and both state and non-state actors can have motives ranging 
from economic gain to geopolitical disruption (or both).19 
Jason Healey’s work has been particularly helpful in thinking about the continuum along which
nation-states conduct, support, and interdict MCA. See JASON HEALEY, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, BEYOND 
ATTRIBUTION: SEEKING NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CYBER ATTACKS (Feb. 22, 2012), https://perma. 
cc/2BJN-GN5K.
In the absence of a comprehensive international legal framework governing 
MCA, most deterrence and enforcement activities remain rooted in domestic law, 
including domestic criminal law.20 
That said, it is worth noting that sixty-three countries, including the United States, have ratified
the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, ETS No. 
185. In addition, at the time of writing, two groups were being formed under UN auspices to continue 
the arduous process of elaborating norms of “responsible State behavior” in cyberspace: a sixth UN 
Group of Governmental Experts (to start in 2019 and report to the UN General Assembly in 2021 under 
the terms of its founding resolution, https://perma.cc/P6YB-3JBK, and a new open-ended group (to start 
in 2019, and report to the UN General Assembly in 2020 under the terms of its founding resolution, 
https://perma.cc/UEE6-JCGD).
Importantly, as senior DHS officials have 
noted, “the vast majority of cyberspace is civilian space.”21 
Jane Holl Lute & Bruce McConnell, Op-Ed: A Civil Perspective on Cybersecurity, WIRED (Feb.
11, 2011, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/K297-8MY8.
One might think these 







predominantly a challenge for transnational law enforcement, analogous to com-
bating other forms of transnational organized crime. Nonetheless, the terms com-
monly used to describe MCA come almost uniformly from a military lexicon. 
The pervasive use of these terms tends to reinforce the predominance of an armed 
conflict model for deterring, and defending against, non-militarized forms of 
MCA.22 
Additional unintended consequences might include the exclusion of certain business losses from
cyber insurance coverage. See, e.g., Adam Satariano & Nicole Perlroth, Big Companies Thought 
Insurance Covered a Cyberattack. They May Be Wrong., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/ 
SNV8-BGNY (describing insurance companies’ refusal to pay claims for business losses associated 
with the NotPetya virus on the grounds that they fell under the “war exclusion”). 
Invoking a war frame may lead policymakers to undervalue malicious cyber 
activity aimed at civilian targets for financial gain. The FBI estimates that these 
forms of MCA—comprising internet-enabled theft, fraud, and exploitation— 
caused at least $2.7 billion in financial losses in 2018.23 
FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, 2018 INTERNET CRIME REPORT 5 (2018), https://perma.cc/G3RU- 
VUPT.
The Center for Strategic 
and International Studies assessed in 2018 that “cybercrime may now cost the 
world almost $600 billion, or 0.8% of global GDP.”24 
CSIS, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CYBERCRIME—NO SLOWING DOWN (Feb. 2018), https://perma.cc/
H7A4-Y9GX.
In light of these trends, a 
more balanced approach to the problem of digital insecurity would place “more 
emphasis on law enforcement and diplomacy to prevent an overreliance on the 
military,” which is ill-suited to addressing the full range of MCA engaged in by 
both state and non-state actors, as described further below.25 
See Mieke Eoyang, Allison Peters, Ishan Mehta & Brandon Gaskew, To Catch a Hacker: Toward
a Comprehensive Strategy to Identify, Pursue, and Punish Malicious Cyber Actors, THIRD WAY 2 (Oct. 
29, 2018) https://perma.cc/3HN9-52WB.
II. ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE ARMED CONFLICT MODEL 
Unauthorized cyber intrusions of all types are referred to colloquially as 
“cyberattacks.” Although experts have parsed the threshold at which MCA 
amounts to an “attack” for the purposes of international humanitarian law,26 the 
terms “cyberattack” and “cyberwar” have become short-hand in discussing all 
forms of MCA, without distinction. As a threshold matter, the Department of 
Defense views “cyberspace” as a war-fighting domain, along with air, land, sea, 
and space.27 Within these domains, armed conflicts can take the form of interna-
tional armed conflicts between nation-states (IACs), on the one hand, or non- 








26. See, e.g., Paul A. Walker, Rethinking Computer Network “Attack”: Implications for Law and
U.S. Doctrine, 1 NAT. SEC. L. BR. 33, 33 (2011); see also Kyle Genaro Phillips, Unpacking Cyberwar: 
The Sufficiency of the Law of Armed Conflict in the Cyber Domain, 70 JOINT FORCE Q. 70, 72 (2013) 
(putting forth a diagram derived from Walker’s analysis). 
27. DEP’T DEF., SUMMARY OF THE 2018 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 3 (2018); but cf. Martin C. Libicki, Cyberspace Is Not a Warfighting Domain, 8 I/S: A J. OF L. 
& POL’Y 321 (2012) (identifying “conceptual errors that may arise by thinking of cyberspace as a 
warfighting domain analogous to the traditional warfighting domains”). 
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groups within the boundaries of a single state (NIACs), on the other. More 
recently, “transnational” or “global” NIACs have challenged the dividing line 
between these categories.28 
The contemporary idea that nation-states maintain a monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force within their respective territories, and that they are willing and able to 
control malicious activity emanating from their territories, breaks down when 
there are relatively few barriers to entry for engaging in that activity. This is partic-
ularly true when it comes to MCA. However, in discussing MCA within a war 
frame, a series of inferences are often made that lead analysts to posit that the de-
terrence frames from the armed conflict context can be applied directly to cyberse-
curity. Cyberwar, like “cyberspace,” is “an influential and charismatic metaphor” 
which shapes the way that many scholars approach their analysis.29 Indeed, 
throughout both the popular and academic literature, malicious cyber acts are fre-
quently discussed in a war frame—whether those acts are performed to disrupt 
services, gather information, steal or extort money, or influence human behavior.30 
In the academic literature, adopting the war frame leads to analysis of cyber activ-
ity within existing paradigms designed to avert conflict, such as deterrence via 
threat of retaliation. This, in turn, can lead to concerns about escalation. 
As James Miller and Neal Pollard have emphasized, “deterrence strategy 
should seek to influence a competitor’s decision-making by denying it the gains  
28. For literature on the challenges involved in classifying armed conflicts, see, for example, David 
E. Graham, Defining Non-International Armed Conflict: A Historically Difficult Task, 88 INT’L L. STUD. 
43, 50–52 (2012) (noting that the U.S. rarely “officially” determines when a conflict has crossed the 
threshold between international and non-international conflict, and that it views the “basic provisions of 
the law of armed conflict” as applying to both categories as a policy matter of policy); Dapo Akande, 
Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in ELIZABETH WILMSHURST (ed.), 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS, ch. 3 (2012) (examining the history and 
consequences of distinguishing between international and non-international armed conflicts); Andreas 
Paulus & Mindia Vashakmadze, Asymmetrical War and the Notion of Armed Conflict: A Tentative 
Conceptualization, 91 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 95 (2009) (emphasizing the need for objective 
criteria to determine when international humanitarian law applies in a given conflict). 
29. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS 
WORLD 16 (2008). 
30. Titles invoking the armed conflict model include: JOHN P. CARLIN, DAWN OF THE CODE WAR: 
AMERICA’S BATTLE AGAINST RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE RISING GLOBAL CYBER THREAT (2018); DAVID 
E. SANGER, THE PERFECT WEAPON: WAR, SABOTAGE, AND FEAR IN THE CYBER AGE (2018); P.W. 
SINGER & EMERSON T. BROOKING, LIKEWAR: THE WEAPONIZATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2018); FRED 
KAPLAN, DARK TERRITORY: THE SECRET HISTORY OF CYBERWAR (reprint edn., 2017); RICHARD A. 
CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBERWAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO 
DO ABOUT IT (2012). Titles that distinguish “cybercrime” from “cyberwarfare” include: JONATHAN 
LUSTHAUS, INDUSTRY OF ANONYMITY: INSIDE THE BUSINESS OF CYBERCRIME (2018); RICHARD A. 
WHITE, CYBERCRIME: THE MADNESS BEHIND THE METHODS (2018); IGOR BERNIK, CYBERCRIME AND 
CYBERWARFARE (2014); P.W. SINGER & ALLAN FRIEDMAN, CYBERSECURITY AND CYBERWAR: WHAT 
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW (2014); BRIAN KREBS, SPAM NATION: THE INSIDE STORY OF ORGANIZED 
CYBERCRIME—FROM GLOBAL EPIDEMIC TO YOUR FRONT DOOR (2014). Titles that fall in-between 
include: MARC GOODMAN, FUTURE CRIMES: INSIDE THE DIGITAL UNDERGROUND AND THE BATTLE FOR 
OUR CONNECTED WORLD (reprint edn. 2016). 
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of its actions, irrespective of any retaliation or escalation.”31 
James N. Miller & Neal A. Pollard, Persistent Engagement, Agreed Competition and Deterrence 
in Cyberspace, LAWFARE (Apr. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/DE5Q-V6LH.
As Jason Healey 
puts it, “[t]he debate on cyber conflict has gotten so locked into deterrence, esca-
lation, coercion, and signaling we pundits often forget that conflict is sometimes 
straightforward and you just have to stop adversaries from punching you.”32 
Jason Healey, Taking Down Russian Trolls is My Kind of Cyberattack, CIPHER BRIEF (Feb. 28, 
2019, 9:12 AM), https://perma.cc/5EA6-RM93. To this end, Michèle Flournoy and Michael Sulmeyer 
have proposed creating “a new cyberdefense agency whose purpose would be not to share information 
or build criminal cases but to help agencies, companies, and communities prevent attacks.” Michèle 
Flournoy & Michael Sulmeyer, Battlefield Internet: A Plan for Securing Cyberspace, FOREIGN AFF. 
(Sept./Oct. 2018), https://perma.cc/9XFX-N63X.
This 
insight has relevance in both the armed conflict and law enforcement paradigms, 
as illustrated by Israel’s Iron Dome program.33 
See, e.g., Jacob Nagel & Jonathan Schanzer, Assessing Israel’s Iron Dome Missile Defense 
System, FOUND. FOR DEF. DEMOCRACIES (Nov. 13, 2019), https://perma.cc/D55W-R3DS (discussing 
advantages and drawbacks of the system). 
Even traditional deterrence theory 
would acknowledge the important role of “deterrence through denial,” in addition 
to “deterrence through punishment.” In the words of Andrew Krepinevich, Jr., 
“[s]ince World War II, U.S. defense strategy has relied on communicating to 
rivals that any aggression would either fail or provoke a devastating counterat-
tack—deterrence in a nutshell.”34 
Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Eroding Balance of Terror: The Decline of Deterrence, FOREIGN 
AFF. (Jan./Feb. 2019), https://perma.cc/G8K9-HY3V; see also Jonathan Solomon, Cyberdeterrence 
between Nation-States: Plausible Strategy or a Pipe Dream?, STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Spring 2011, 1-25 
(assessing challenges for punitive cyberdeterrence and concluding that “cyberdeterrence by denial may 
actually be the stronger and more credible strategic path for the United States”). 
That said, the problems with excessive reliance 
on this model in the cyber context (not to mention post-Cold War international 
relations more generally) include the relatively low cost of attacking compared to 
the high cost of defending; problems of attribution (leading to delayed responses 
and the risk of being deceived by “false flag” operations); and the multiplicity of 
adversaries with varying degrees of connection to, and control by, foreign 
states.35 
As many critics have noted, however, despite the pervasiveness of the war 
frame as a metaphor, malicious cyber acts do not fit neatly within it. As Thomas 
Rid wrote in Cyber War Will Not Take Place, the traditional Clauswitzian defini-







35. To be fair, these problems are not entirely unique to the cyber “domain.” As Dorothy Denning 
observes with respect to land, sea, air, space, and cyber: “all are domains of human practice, 
characterized by a wide range of activity by both state and nonstate actors, some of which is hard to 
attribute, and by a variety of weapons ranging in availability, cost, and effects produced.” Dorothy E. 
Denning, Rethinking the Cyber Domain and Deterrence, 77 JOINT FORCE Q. 8, 15 (April 2015). 
Additional complications arise from lack of clarity surrounding the international standards—legal or 
otherwise—governing the conduct of certain cyber activities that fall below the “use of force” threshold. 
See, e.g., Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 
36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421 (2011); Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations in International Law: The Use of 
Force, Collective Security, Self-Defense, and Armed Conflicts, in PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON 
DETERRING CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 151 
(2010). 
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of cyber attacks that amount to acts of war.36 He lays out three criteria that, if 
present, would identify a cyber act as an act of war. First, war is an act of force to 
compel the enemy to do one’s will. Second, war is instrumental and violence is 
the means for the attacker to achieve its ends. Finally, an act of war is always po-
litical in nature. Even to analyze MCAs through this frame, one must make cer-
tain assumptions about the nature of the actors and the environment in which they 
operate. Popular writers and even academic analysts view MCAs under the cyber-
war frame, without examining whether these basic assumptions apply. 
At their core, the laws of armed conflict developed to constrain the behavior of 
nation-states. As such, the framework assumes some basic characteristics of a 
given conflict, including (1) territoriality; (2) sovereignty; and, relatedly (3) the 
state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Yet, when applied to the experi-
ence of institutions confronting MCAs, these assumptions do not describe the 
environment in which malicious actions and responses occur. 
(1) Territoriality. Deeply embedded in the international order is the idea of 
territoriality and control over physical space.37 Historically, international armed 
conflicts often arose over contested territory.38 The principle of territorial integ-
rity enshrined in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter establishes the sanc-
tity of territory as a cornerstone of peace. However, MCAs challenge the 
centrality of territory. The internet is everywhere and nowhere at the same time. 
The physical layer has locality, with wires and cables flowing across physical ter-
ritory, and servers and terminals located within specific jurisdictions, but actions 
and their effects are not necessarily determined or limited by those locations.39 
Due to the migration to cloud computing and platform-based access, MCAs can 
be viewed as occurring wherever the actor is located (which can be spoofed to an 
alternate location), or wherever the victim experiences the consequences. As 
some have noted, data have no intrinsic territoriality.40 
Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L. J. 326 (2015). It is easy to become 
tied up in knots thinking about jurisdiction in cyberspace. That said, at a basic level, MCA involves (1) 
one or more human beings (2) giving instructions via computers to (3) produce a result, whether that 
result involves purely digital effects (e.g., stealing bitcoin) or changes the behavior of another human 
being (e.g., by eliciting a response to a fraudulent request). Results that involve changing human 
behavior are sometimes referred to as “cyber-enabled” or “internet-enabled” crime. See, e.g., Neil 
Desai, Tackling Cyber-enabled Crime Will Require Public-Private Leadership, https://perma.cc/ 
WX9B-END3 (visited Jan. 18, 2021). Regardless of the label, there are one or more perpetrators, and 
one or more direct or indirect victims. Both perpetrator(s) and victim(s) are subject to the laws of one or 
more nation-states based on ties of nationality and/or territory. In the absence of an international judicial 
system, attaching legal consequences to conduct that violates those laws falls to the domestic authorities 
of one or more of those states. 
A cyberattack dreamed up in St. Petersburg and executed in Macedonia across 
servers located in Poland or Ireland, against an office in Washington, D.C. but 
36. THOMAS RID, CYBER WAR WILL NOT TAKE PLACE 1–4 (2013). 
37. Dominic D.P. Johnson & Monica Duffy Toft, Grounds for War: The Evolution of Territorial 
Conflict, 38 INT’L SEC. 7 (2013). 
38. Id. 
39. Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L. J. 317, 322-25 (2015). 
40. 
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accessed remotely in Cancun poses serious challenges to a territorially-based 
conception of jurisdiction, let alone armed conflict. It is theoretically possible for 
nation-states to categorize and respond to MCA based on the location of the 
attack’s origin and its effects. However, the originating territory is not always 
clear and often can’t be identified quickly, thus undermining traditional deter-
rence models that depend upon swift and accurate responses. 
(2) Sovereignty. Underlying the traditional model of international armed con-
flict is the principle of Westphalian sovereignty—the idea that states can control 
what happens domestically while adhering to principles of non-intervention 
across international borders. But the borderless, ubiquitous nature of the internet 
means that in this space notions of Westphalian sovereignty do not readily apply. 
While states may have the notional ability to regulate actions originating in their 
territory through application of local laws and regulations, most governments cur-
rently have little ability to prevent impacts within their territory of actions taken 
elsewhere through cyberspace. 
Further, because the infrastructure of the internet was largely created and is 
currently maintained by private sector actors, the ability of states to control cross- 
border data flows is largely hindered by a lack of control over both the mecha-
nisms and the content of the internet. In particular, where technology and internet 
companies provide multinational platforms, individual users may take actions 
that are prohibited within an impacted country but are legal where the user is 
located. For example, a comedy show taped in Manhattan, New York and 
uploaded by a company in Los Gatos, California can reach a global audience, 
some of whom may find that the content violates local speech laws.41 
Jim Rutenberg, Netflix Bow to Saudi Censors Comes at a Cost to Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
6, 2019), https://perma.cc/8ATD-YRWH.
Because 
states have much less of a monopoly on cyber infrastructure and activity than 
they do on weapons and their use, the ability of a state to maintain domestic con-
trol of cyber activity relies on cooperation from civilian commercial entities. 
(3) State monopoly on legitimate use of force. The biggest challenge to view-
ing MCAs through a cyberwar lens is that the laws governing the resort to armed 
force traditionally assume that states have a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force. Historically, part of the definition of being a state is the ability to control 
force emanating from within one’s territory. Command and control, organization 
into armies, and use of uniforms all signal that a state, not an individual, has 
authorized the actions being taken. 
This does not mean that all uses of military force are actually controlled by the 
state, but states traditionally had sufficient control to serve as effective interna-
tional gatekeepers. Classical theories of deterrence, including in the nuclear 
arena, have developed on the theory that it is the sovereign ruler—whether an 
elected leader or a dictator—who is in control of either initiating or responding to 
the use of force. Military planners could generally rely on certain assumptions 
about the cause-and-effect relationship between their strategies and the desired 
41. 
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outcomes. But in the cyber domain, many of the MCAs that occur are conducted 
not by states but by private actors looking for gain, stealing information, or even 
just demonstrating proof of concept. From the perspective of the victimized en-
tity, the effect may be clear, but the motive may not be. Indeed, there is a spec-
trum of state involvement in the cyber domain, from unsanctioned criminals, 
through “patriotic hackers,” all the way up to national armies.42 Each of these 
groups might be susceptible (or not) to different types of coercive responses, just 
as the states hosting such groups (either deliberately or inadvertently) might be 
amenable (or not) to direct responses by affected states. The situation is compli-
cated even further by the current lack of a clear, shared understanding about the 
types of cyber activities that are, and are not, prohibited on a global scale, even 
though many countries have at least codified restrictions on criminal uses of the 
internet in their domestic laws. 
Further, when it comes to online malicious acts, the state does not have the 
same degree of monopoly on the use of force that it does with either conventional 
or nuclear weapons. First, the development and use of so-called “cyber weapons” 
and the execution of code are not limited to government weapons designers. The 
code through which exploits are used are designed and built by private, commer-
cial engineers outside of the defense contracting context. There is now a robust 
private sector market for the same kinds of offensive tools used by governments, 
which can now be used to target private companies and individuals. Criminals on 
the darkweb trade in tools designed to exfiltrate data, interrupt services, and build 
ransomware attacks. Even when states design, build, and stockpile cyberwea-
pons, they cannot guarantee exclusive control of their tools.43 
See Bruce Schneier, Who Are the Shadow Brokers? What Is-And Isn’t—Known About the 
Mysterious Hackers Leaking National Security Agency Secrets, ATLANTIC (May 23, 2017), https:// 
perma.cc/5DT7-RDN4.
States are unwilling 
to engage in the same kinds of transparency and verification regimes of their 
cyber-tools to demonstrate their exclusive control. In the absence of a state 
monopoly on the use of force, the idea of state-to-state deterrence as an effective 
solution to curbing cyber conflict is unlikely to yield a cessation of hostile 
activity. 
In sum, discussions of “cyberwar” tend to over-emphasize military responses 
as well as the development of rules of conduct analogous to the rules of armed 
conflict. This can crowd out thinking about MCA through other frames and devel-
oping other institutional responses. 
III. CYBERWAR VS. CYBERCRIME 
The threat of cyberwar, and the pervasiveness of cybercrime, require vigilance 
and action by government and the private sector (which controls vast swaths of criti-
cal infrastructure). An armed conflict model of deterrence can provide a framework 
for addressing certain types of cyber-threats from hostile nation-states that we might 
42. See HEALEY, supra note 19. 
43. 
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think of as falling into the “war” category. It does little, however, to address the dan-
gers posed by cybercrime. Currently, private sector incentives to invest in cyberse-
curity include the reputational costs associated with breaches; business losses 
associated with impaired functionality; and potential regulatory and tort liability.44 
See, e.g., Nathaniel Sobol, The SEC and Cybersecurity Regulation, LAWFARE (Nov. 19, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/H9YB-87GP; Alan Butler, Products Liability and the Internet of (Insecure) Things: 
Should Manufacturers Be Liable for Damage Caused by Hacked Devices?, 50 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 
913 (2017); Robert L. Rabin, Perspectives on Privacy, Data Security, and Tort Law, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 
313 (2017); but cf. Stewart Baker, Why Tort Liability for Data Breaches Won’t Improve Cybersecurity, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 11, 2015), https://perma.cc/M2WD-B2PP (noting that “the actual damages 
from data breaches are pretty modest in dollar terms, and the pattern of losses makes it very hard to 
sustain a single class, something that forces up the cost of litigation for the plaintiffs”). 
The law enforcement infrastructure required to support these efforts has not kept 
pace with the scale of the threat or the degree of danger it poses. 
The conceptual and doctrinal framework used to differentiate between “armed 
attacks” that give rise to the right of self-defense under U.N. Charter Article 51 and 
all other types of conduct is notoriously difficult to apply in the cyber context.45 
See, e.g., Kubo Mačák, Scenario 13: Cyber Operations as a Trigger of the Law of Armed Conflict, 
CYBER LAW TOOLKIT, https://perma.cc/UA4F-Q57K (last edited Jan. 14, 2020). On the question of 
identifying the threshold for an international or a non-international armed conflict, see Laurie R. Blank & 
Benjamin R. Farley, Identifying the Start of Conflict: Conflict Recognition, Operational Realities and 
Accountability in the Post-9/11 World, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 467, 478-87 (2015). This question also has 
implications for the cyber insurance market, as illustrated by the Mondelez case involving whether a policy’s 
exemption for “hostile or warlike” actions covers damage from the NotPetya virus. See Brian Corcoran, 
What Mondelez v. Zurich May Reveal About Cyber Insurance in the Age of Digital Conflict, LAWFARE (Mar. 
8, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc/7XNS-BLH6.
Moreover, even if relevant actors agree on whether the result of a particular cyber 
operation is the functional equivalent of a kinetic “attack” for Article 51 purposes, 
delays and ambiguity in attribution further complicate the picture. Although engag-
ing in debates about the appropriate “control” test for attribution remain beyond the 
scope of this article, attributing MCA—and substantiating that attribution without 
revealing sources and methods—can impede efforts to expose and punish individual 
wrongdoers and the states that may direct or support them.46 
While individuals may bear criminal responsibility under both international 
and domestic law, state responsibility has generally been understood as non-crim-
inal in nature.47 A state might owe a duty of cessation, restitution, reparation, or 
satisfaction, but states are not generally subject to penal sanctions. Individuals, 
on the other hand, can and do bear individual criminal responsibility for viola-
tions of both domestic and international criminal law—often, even when they 
were acting at the direction, or on behalf, of a foreign state. States are beginning 
to navigate the difficult terrain of imposing criminal penalties on individuals for 




46. On attribution generally, see, e.g., Kristen E. Boon, Are Control Tests Fit for the Future? The 
Problem in Attribution Doctrines, 15 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 1 (2014). 
47. See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, Categorizing Acts by State Officials: Attribution and Responsibility 
in the Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 26 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 451, 461 (2016) (noting that state 
responsibility in international law has traditionally been understood as the functional equivalent of 
“liability” in municipal law). 
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immunity has traditionally sought to avoid. Just as targeted sanctions attempt to 
influence state behavior by pressuring individual foreign officials, so too does the 
threat of prosecution aim to dis-incentivize individuals from engaging in MCA, 
even on behalf of foreign states. The traditional distinction between “official” or 
“public” acts, on the one hand, and “private” acts (such as those taken for perso-
nal benefit or financial gain), on the other, has already come under pressure with 
the increasing recognition of the need to prosecute and punish international 
crimes. The widespread phenomenon of state-sponsored cybercrime promises to 
further challenge, and perhaps erode, this distinction, at least in certain contexts. 
IV. TOWARDS A GLOBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT MODEL 
Given the difficulty in achieving international consensus and cooperation, the 
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (CETS No. 185) remains the only binding 
international instrument on cybercrime. It serves as a guideline for countries 
developing national legislation against cybercrime, and it seeks to provide a 
framework for international cooperation between states parties to the treaty. The 
Cybercrime Convention Committee meets twice per year in an effort to facilitate 
the effective use and implementation of the Convention, and to consider future 
amendments.48 
See T-CY Plenaries, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://perma.cc/L9CE-8XQ5.
However, the Convention’s reach is far from global, and does not 
include China or Russia. In addition, problems persist in securing agreement on 
provisions that would facilitate investigations, prosecutions, and extraditions 
without impinging unduly on privacy and human rights. Alexander Seger, 
Executive Secretary of the Cybercrime Convention Committee, has written: 
With cyberspace considered the “fifth domain of warfare” considerable resour-
ces are allocated by States to defensive and offensive military capabilities and 
information operations, with the obvious risk of a further militarisation of 
cyberspace. Criminal justice obviously offers a higher level of protection of 
the rights of individuals than national security or defence solutions. However, 
the very need to protect the rights of individuals and to meet data protection 
and other rule of law requirements may very well lead to a dilemma: if crimi-
nal justice authorities are no longer able to investigate cybercrime and secure 
electronic evidence in an effective manner, competencies and resources may 
further shift to national security and intelligence bodies without the same level 
of safeguards.49 
Alexander Seger, Enhanced Cooperation on Cybercrime: A Case for a Protocol to the Budapest 
Convention, ITALIAN INST. FOR INT’L POL. STUD. (July 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/94V3-Y6WB. For 
concerns about the recent passage of a Russia-sponsored U.N. resolution on cybercrime that threatens an 
“open, free, and secure model of the internet,” see Joyce Hakmeh & Allison Peters, A New UN 
Cybercrime Treaty? The Way Forward for Supporters of an Open, Free, and Secure Internet, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/MD9T-WF7H.
Despite these challenges, domestic law prohibitions on unauthorized cyber ac-
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prohibitions requires adequate resources and training at the domestic level, as 
well as multinational cooperation in evidence-gathering and, potentially, appre-
hension of suspects when MCA crosses borders, as it regularly does. 
A recent Council on Foreign Relations report underscores the importance of 
capacity-building under a law enforcement framework, noting: 
A common misperception is that the principal cybersecurity threats demanding 
urgent international collaboration are massive, state sponsored attacks that tar-
get critical infrastructure such as power plants or electrical grids, causing mas-
sive devastation and human casualties. In fact, cyber threats are more diverse 
and complex, often targeting private enterprises and endangering the technical 
integrity of the digital world. The near-total digitization of business models 
makes the global economy more vulnerable to cyberattacks, not only from 
states but also from criminal organizations and other nonstate actors.50 
Council on Foreign Relations, Increasing International Cooperation in Cybersecurity and 
Adapting Cyber Norms (Feb. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/R6W3-V4HR.
The engagement of intergovernmental organizations such as Interpol,51 
INTERPOL, CYBERCRIME, https://perma.cc/9PKT-LHWT.
the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,52 
CYBERCRIME, UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, https://perma.cc/39PB-YL8N; see also 
UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS AND CRIME, COMPREHENSIVE STUDY ON CYBERCRIME (Feb. 2013), 
https://perma.cc/PPL9-D3Z8.
the International Telecommunications 
Union,53 
ITU-D Cybersecurity, INT’L TELECOMMS. UNION, https://perma.cc/F8KY-SFZV.
and the Council of Europe54 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ACTION AGAINST CYBERCRIME, https://perma.cc/R4YJ-JCUW.
in coordination and capacity-building efforts 
remains critical in expanding domestic capabilities, with due regard for human 
rights concerns.55 
See, e.g., Myrian Dunn Cavelty & Camino Kavanagh, Cybersecurity and Human Rights, in BEN 
WAGNER, MATTHIAS C. KETTEMANN & KILLAN VIETH (eds.), RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY, ch. 5 (2019) (exploring the relationship between cybersecurity and human 
rights); Ronald J. Deibert, Towards a Human-Centric Approach to Cybersecurity, 32 ETHICS & INT’L 
AFF. 411 (2018) (advocating for an approach to cybersecurity that prioritizes the individual rather than 
the state, including by creating multiple forms of independent oversight and review); Andrew N. 
Liaropoulos, Reconceptualising Cyber Security: Safeguarding Human Rights in the Era of Cyber 
Surveillance, 6 INT’L J. OF CYBER WARFARE & TERRORISM 33 (2016) (arguing that the dominance of 
war metaphors in cyber security discourse has failed to address the needs of people). For interventions 
from civil society groups, see, e.g., How Law Enforcement Can Access Data Across Borders—Without 
Crushing Human Rights, IFEX (July 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/2HYW-2X8F; Mapping Cybercrime 
Laws and Violations of Digital Rights in Gulf and Neighboring Countries, GULF CENTRE FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS (June 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/L3HZ-DWWZ; Anja Kovacs & Dixie Hawtin, Cyber Security, 
Cyber Surveillance and Online Human Rights (May 2013), https://perma.cc/UN9W-SJ7W.
Nongovernmental organizations, such as the Global Cyber 
Alliance, also have an important role to play.56 
GLOBAL CYBER ALLIANCE, MISSION & PURPOSE, https://perma.cc/7CTN-KZK9.
The technical and logistical difficulties of deterring garden-variety cybercrime 
should not be underestimated, but this is a reason to devote more—not fewer— 
resources to the effort. Joshua Tromp has described the challenge of deterring 
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Comparing cyber-attacks to the analogy of a child stealing cookies from a 
cookie jar, the current environment is one where a child knows he should go 
ahead and steal the cookie. The child’s parents are unable to determine who 
took the cookie or in many cases to even notice a cookie is missing. And the 
parents are severely limited in enacting any significant punishment for taking 
the cookie. For the child, the benefits are great and the costs are low.57 
Joshua Tromp, Law of Armed Conflict, Attribution, and the Challenges of Deterring Cyber- 
Attacks, SMALL WARS J. (2016), https://perma.cc/5DXC-XRMP.
Although Tromp argues for clearer deterrent options under an armed conflict 
model, the “deterrence by punishment” approach under a law enforcement model 
also has much to commend it. In both cases, a core problem today is the lack of 
certainty that punishment will ensue—to the contrary, the likelihood of detection 
of malfeasance and follow-through by authorities is vanishingly small.58 
Although empirical research on deterrence faces numerous methodological challenges, 
criminologists have concluded in a number of studies that declining crime rates are associated with an 
increased likelihood (certainty) of apprehension and punishment. See Five Things About Deterrence, 
NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (June 5, 2016), https://perma.cc/55TW-33WC; see also Kelli D. Tomlinson, An 
Examination of Deterrence Theory: Where Do We Stand?, 80 FED. PROBATION 33 (Dec. 2016), https:// 
perma.cc/Q38B-W7DV.
Duncan Hollis suggested in 2011 that features endemic to MCA make it futile 
to rely on strategies of deterrence by proscription and punishment. In his view, 
“[i]f cyberattackers assume that they cannot be identified (let alone sanctioned), 
rules prohibiting cyberattacks and exploits will have little deterrent effect.”59 Eric 
Jensen, by contrast, has characterized deterrence via the imposition of criminal or 
civil penalties as a form of “legal strike back.”60 As Jensen emphasizes, however, 
“legal strike back can only be an effective means of deterrence when states work 
together with the common goal of suppressing malicious cyber activity.”61 For 
this reason, a law enforcement model of deterrence must also involve an empha-
sis on diplomatic efforts to prioritize and to incentivize international cooperation. 
In addition to problems of insufficient capacity, coordination, and consensus, a 
complication also arises from the fact that some highly-publicized MCA appears 
to be carried out by individuals at the direction, and/or with the tacit support, of 
the very states that are charged with suppressing and punishing MCA. Any steps 
that the United States takes to punish individuals involved in these efforts, or to 
hold states responsible for failure to suppress MCA emanating from their terri-
tory, will raise questions of the degree to which the United States is willing to 
subject itself, and its personnel, to similar enforcement efforts undertaken by 
other states. This is one of the many reasons that cooperative approaches, where 
possible, are likely to yield more sustainable results than unilateral measures. 
Moreover, the potentially sensitive diplomatic issues raised by these high-profile 
cases should not detract from efforts to combat the large swath of MCA that is 





59. Duncan Hollis, An e-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L. J. 373, 378 (2011). 
60. Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Deterrence, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 773, 800 (2012). 
61. Id. at 806. 
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Fig. 2 
Disaggregating Threats & Responses: A War/Crime Continuum 
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By disaggregating and differentiating among different types of MCA, includ-
ing by their provenance, goals, and (where ascertainable) motivations, we can 
move towards a more comprehensive and coordinated response to this ever-grow-
ing problem.  
